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Last year Kaliningrad became the subject of an international
debate involving first of all the European Union, Russia, the
USA, and the countries bordering the enclave, Poland and Li-
thuania. Such keen interest in a small region of less than
a million inhabitants was mainly due to the fact that Kalinin-
grad has found itself in the very centre of two processes
which are of paramount importance for Europe: EU and 
NATO enlargement. If Lithuania becomes a member of those
units and Poland joins the EU, this Russian enclave will be-
come an island surrounded on all land borders by a totally
different, political, economic and military entity. In the cour-
se of the debate many questions were raised about the situ-
ation in the Oblast and how it affects neighbouring countries,
the real interests and intentions of the parties involved in the
debate, and the future of the region. 
The authors of this publication are attempting to answer the-
se questions. The first part of this analysis is devoted to pre-
senting the most important internal problems of the enclave,
considering their influence on the surrounding world and the
consequences of adopting the acquis communautaire in Po-
land and Lithuania. The second part characterises Mo-
scowÕs policies towards Kaliningrad on the one hand, and
those of Western countries on the other. Finally, the authors
discuss the probable ways in which the situation in the 
enclave will develop. 
1. The Internal situation 
in the Kaliningrad Oblast and 
its influence on the surrounding
c o u n t r i e s
1.1. The political scene
On the regional level, the most powerful authority in Kaliningrad
(as in other subjects of the Russian Federation) is the gubernato-
rial administration. It is responsible for (among other matters) the
form and implementation of the budget; it grants licenses for ex-
ploitation of natural resources, decides who wins tenders for import
quotas, and so on. Thanks to such powers, the regionÕ s main finan-
cial resources are channelled to the gubernatorial administration,
which in the Russian conditions translates into influence in the
internal political scene. The role of the oblast Duma is even less
significant than would result from its limited formal powers. 
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It does not exercise true control over budget expenditure. If ne-
cessary, the gubernatorial administration can control all impor-
tant voting by means of political pressure and bribes (as was re-
adily noticeable after the last regional elections, during the elec-
tion of the speaker of the local Duma, and while approving the
first deputy governor). 
The gubernatorial elections in mid-November 2000 brought vic-
tory to then Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vladimir Yegorov, who
defeated the regionÕs previous head Leonid Gorbenko in the run-
off. The elections to the local Duma took place at the same time,
that brought victory to Yegorov supporters. 
The exchange of elites did however have little influence on impro-
ving the quality of policy-making in the Oblast. Strong links re-
main between the authorities and business life in Kaliningrad.
The company which enjoys the strongest political influence in the
enclave is an oblast branch of the largest Russian oil company,
LUKoil. In return for the election support it gave Yegorov, the com-
pany got the chance to shape personnel policy within the local
authorities (among other decisions LUKoil was afactor in the ap-
pointments of the speaker of the local Duma and the first deputy
governor). The regional authorities are likewise corrupt, just as
they have been for the last few years, and in circles close to the
governor there are people with a criminal past who are known to
be connected with organised crime. 
It should be emphasised, however, that the practise of exercising
power over the Kaliningrad Oblast is no different to what is hap-
pening in Russia in general. It is peculiar to the enclave that it is
a stronghold of the army, which can influence certain decisions
taken by the regional administration Ð with the helping hand of
Yegorov and numerous officers connected with the administration
and business. At the same time, however, the majority of the offi-
cer corps in the enclave and the present commander of the Baltic
Fleet, vice admiral Vladimir Valuyev (who took office on April 11th,
2001) seem entirely devoted to Ye g o r o v.
The change in the ruling team has not resulted in any radical im-
provement in policy-making within the region, but it has in fact
brought about some significant changes in relations between the
Oblast and Moscow. Although ex-governor Gorbenko tried to avo-
id entering into open conflict with Moscow, he repeatedly took
certain actions in the name of his own narrow interests, which
contradicted the federal authoritiesÕ wishes. In contrast to his
predecessor, Yegorov on one hand enjoys respect and support in
Moscow, and on the other hand is also entirely loyal. This position
enables him to efficiently lobby for the interests of the region wi-
thin federal structures (e.g. YegorovÕsinfluence manifests itself in
the fact that he is, together with German Gref, minister of trade
and economic development, the co-author of the govern-
mentÕs programme for the OblastÕsdevelopment. For more infor-
mation on MoscowÐKaliningrad relations, see point 2.1). 
The change in elite has brought about much better prospects for
developing cooperation between the region and other countries.
The new governor is undoubtedly a much more predictable per-
son, and is much more open to international cooperation than his
predecessor used to be. 
1.2. Economic situation 
The last decade witnessed significant change in the character of
the regionÕs economy. Whereas at the beginning of the 1990s
goods production (fishing, machine industry, cellulose industry)
had played the leading part, making up 56 percent of added 
value to gross regional product, then in the second half of the de-
cade the services sector (trade, transport, communication) took
the lead with a share of 69 percent in gross regional product in
19981. It must be noted that the cause of this trend is not the mo-
dernisation of KaliningradÕs economy, but a drastic fall in indu-
strial and agricultural production in the enclave. The first one
dropped by 70 percent in the period 1990 to 1999 (in Russia in
general, by 50 percent)2. The second one in 1999 reached 45 per-
cent of the 1990 level (as opposed to 57 percent in Russia)3. Ne-
gative tendencies are noted also in the extraction of oil (since
1990 it has fallen nearly by 50 percent4), which is a principal
export good for the region. Although Kaliningrad has the largest
amber deposits in the world, amber extraction does not bring too
much revenue to the region, because it is for the most part expor-
ted illegally. Smuggled amber is so widely available, and its price
is so low that this writes off any profitability for legal export of this
m a t e r i a l .
Negative opinion about this situation cannot be altered by the
facts that last year the Oblast recorded a substantial increase in
real income of the inhabitants in relation to 1999 (26.8 percent,
compared to an average increase in Russia of 12.7 percent), and
that inflation over the same period was lower than the nationwide
figure (17.5 percent in Kaliningrad, 20.2 percent in Russia)5.
The administration of the former governor can be only partially
blamed for this state of affairs. For instance, it took up ahuge fo-
reign loan but the money was not well spent; consequently the
OblastÕs overall debt today amounts to nearly 1.3 billion roubles,
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and servicing the debt will involve more than 58 percent of the re-
gional budget in 20016. The bad economic situation is, first and
foremost, due to the economic slump throughout the Russian Fe-
deration and also to the lack of any plan for regional development
on the federal level. Another major factor that affects the encla-
veÕs economy adversely is the regionÕs separation from its mo-
therland. This fact means an increase in the costs of goods trans-
port between the enclave and the rest of the country, which in
turn lowers the profitability of production in Kaliningrad, and adds
to the very high prices of goods transported from other regions of
the Russian Federation. 
In order to solve the problem of high transport costs7, a Free Eco-
nomic Zone was established in the enclave in 1991. Introducing
the possibility of duty-free transport of goods to Kaliningrad was
supposed to lower the prices of goods imported from abroad, and
at the same time it has limited expensive supplies (burdened by
transit costs) from other regions of the Russian Federation. 
However this preferential economic treatment, granted by a di-
rective issued by the Council of Ministers and then confirmed by
a presidential decree, was eliminated step by step. In this case,
the only way to regain preferential customs treatment was to
push an appropriate law through parliament. The Act on the Spe-
cial Economic Zone, which is still binding, was signed by the pre-
sident in 1996. By virtue of this act the Oblast was granted the
right to import raw materials and semi-finished articles from out-
side the Russian Federation without customs duties and border
taxes. If a product is processed in the Oblast to such an extent
that it can be regarded as Ômade in KaliningradÕ (30 or 15 percent
depending on the productÕs category), it can then be transported,
duty-free, to other regions of Russia8. It is worth mentioning that
the act does not provide for any special tax breaks in the Ob-
lastÕs territory, apart from those applied in the rest of Russia.
The existence of the SEZ has not ensured the enclave any great
interest from foreign investors. This is demonstrated by the rela-
tively small level of foreign investment in the Oblast: US$16 mil-
lion in 1995, US$23 million in 1996, US$11 million in 1997,
US$39 million in 1998, US$18 million in 19999 and US$19 million
in 200010. Among the largest investments in the Oblast, the con-
struction of the ãKaliningradskii DelikatesÓ enterprise is worthy of
mention; it processes meat imported from Lithuania; construc-
tion of a factory that produces car parts from imported compo-
nents (from the Czech firm Brisk) and an assembly plant for KIA
and BMW cars. 
The Special Economic Zone has not however led to the expected
economic breakthrough in the region as exhibited by adrop in fo-
reign trade turnover over the last few years. Exports from the Ob-
last amounted to US$425.7 million in 199711, US$312 million in
1998 and US$285.7 million in 199912; imports to the Oblast 
reached US$1.3 billion in 19971 3, US$1.1 billion in 1998 and
US$761 million in 19991 4. The positive effects of setting up the SEZ
are seriously limited by the lack of a law on private ownership of
land, weaknesses in the banking system, and most of all by the
unstable legal situation. Furthermore, the SEZÕs present stru-
cture has been heavily criticised by federal officials for being con-
ducive to duty-free transport of goods to Russia (which means
that the State Treasury loses out), and not giving a stimulus to
high-quality production for export. 
A strong barrier to the development of both the free economic zo-
ne and the Kaliningrad economy as a whole is corruption among
state officials and frequent financial abuses. 
Another considerable problem that limits the chances for deve-
lopment in the Kaliningrad Oblast is the poor condition of the ro-
ad infrastructure in the enclave itself and the lack of well-deve-
loped transport connections with neighbouring countries. There
have been proposals to develop international connections, but
they do not seem to be very rational. In its report ãThe European
Union and KaliningradÓ, published 17 January this year, the Euro-
pean Commission recommended that the following steps should
be considered: extending the TallinnÐRigaÐKaliningrad road (the
Via Hanseatica) by a section to GdaÄsk, and constructing a b r a n c h
of the HelsinkiÐTa l l i n n Ð R i g a Ð Ka u n a s Ð Warsaw route (the Via Bal-
t i c a) to Kaliningrad (for more information on the EC Communica-
tion see point 2.2). In Moscow, in turn, a project is being consi-
dered to introduce asea link between Petersburg and Kaliningrad,
which would lower the present costs of personnel and goods
transit through the Baltic States. This would also facilitate com-
munication with the enclave after Lithuania and LatviaÕs intro-
duction of visas for Russians. The anticipated traffic flow on the
new sections will not, however, balance the costs incurred. We
should take into consideration the fact that other regions in Rus-
sia export their goods to the West through the Baltic ports on one
hand, and through the territory of Belarus and Ukraine on the
other. So, from the perspective of central Russia, Kaliningrad has
lost its transit significance for many years. The visa regime that
will be introduced in the near future on KaliningradÕsborders with
Poland and Lithuania will make the region even less attractive for
foreign hauliers as well, who will undoubtedly choose routes 
going through the open Polish-Lithuanian border.
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Regarding energy supply, the consequences of LithuaniaÕs inte-
gration into the EU may well be noticeable in Kaliningrad. Lithu-
ania is currently considering two plans for getting connected to
the European power engineering system: by frequency converter
stations on the border with Poland (in that case Lithuania would
keep the present voltage parameters in the network, which are
identical to those in Russia), or by means of switching over the
whole power engineering network to western European voltage.
Adopting the latter solution will mean that electricity can no lon-
ger flow to Kaliningrad from other regions of Russia (presently its
main suppliers are power engineering plants in the Leningrad and
Voronezh Oblasts) via the Lithuanian network (as of now up to 90
percent of electricity used in the enclave flows through Lithuanian
territory). 
1.3. Social situation
The poor economic situation is largely responsible for numerous
social problems in the enclave. Last year the average monthly in-
come per capita in the enclave amounted to 2200 roubles
(US$78), whereas at the same time the cost of a basket of basic
foodstuffs amounted to around 770 roubles (the nationwide ave-
rage in Russia was 752 roubles)1 5. Average income in the enclave
is thus not only several times lower than in Lithuania (US$268)1 6,
or in Poland (US$437)17, but is even lower than the average inco-
me in Russia (2508 roubles, currently US$89)18. Besides, there is
a huge differentiation in the financial situation of the people thro-
ughout the Oblast. More than half of the population live in the 
capital, where wages are the highest; at the end of last year they
reached 3000-3500 roubles per month19. At the same time, wa-
ges in the rest of the enclave, which is suffering from the decline
in industry and a crisis in agriculture, do not exceed 900 roubles
(in cities) or even 600 roubles (in rural areas)20. It is, however,
difficult to assess the real situation of the Kaliningrad community
because almost every inhabitant of the region benefits from un-
official and, of course, untaxed, business activity. For many of
them, particularly outside the centre, non-licensed amber extrac-
tion, or minor smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes and petrol through
the border is often the only livelihood21.
The poor financial situation among most of the enclaveÕs resi-
dents, and the permanent under-financing of the national health
service are also the reasons for low health immunity in the region.
In this context it is very difficult to stop such diseases as tuber-
culosis or influenza, which also affect population in Ukraine, Be-
larus and Lithuania, from spreading further into the Russian enc-
lave. In the Kaliningrad community of less than a million people,
as many as 3788 cases of HIV have already been detected 22,
which is bound to evoke grave fears when compared to the data
on the situation in Poland (7000 cases from 38 millions inhabi-
tants)23. The lack of development prospects and job opportunities
for young people also contributes to the widespread problem of
drug addiction. 
The bad social situation in the region is not only an internal pro-
blem of the enclave but also a threat to the neighbouring coun-
tries. From the Polish or Lithuanian perspectives, the most se-
rious problem is the organised crime flourishing in Ka l i n i n g r a d .
One of the main sources of profit in criminal circles is extortion
from local and foreign businessmen operating in the Oblast; orga-
nised criminal activity also deals with prostitution and smuggling.
The differences between Kaliningrad and the neighbouring coun-
tries in the prices of goods and services encourage people to 
take advantage of the situation and make handsome profits. The
most frequently smuggled goods are alcohol and cigarettes, and
also to a lesser extent fuel (in 2000 the value of these goods
smuggled from the enclave to Poland was estimated at around
US$200 million)24. Kaliningrad also illegally exports arms and
drugs, but it is difficult to determine the scale of this activity.
1.4. Transit and cross-border traffic
In the context of the OblastÕs sparse population, passenger traf-
fic on the Kaliningrad border is relatively heavy. In 2000 the bor-
der of the enclave was crossed 8.5 millions times in passenger
traffic; 3.6 millions crossings on the Lithuanian side and 4.4 mil-
lions on the Polish side25. (The remaining 0.5 millions crossings
are accounted for by people travelling by plane)26.
These high rates of border crossing mainly result from what is
called Ôant tradeÕ, that is, the phenomenon of repeated carrying of
relatively small amounts of goods by the same persons in order
to sell them for a profit on the other side of the border. It is esti-
mated that around 90 percent of crossings on the Polish-Kalinin-
grad border are related to such business27, and the same goes for
80 percent of crossings on the Lithuanian-Kaliningrad border28.
Some crossings on the enclaveÕs border with Lithuania concern
people who are travelling via Belarus and Lithuania from and to
other regions of the Russian Federation. Because of poor plane
links between the enclave and the rest of the country (there are
around a dozen flights amonth, but there is no knowing whether
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the number of flights will not be limited or even eliminated alto-
gether, due to wear and tear on the fleet), the main means of
transport for Russian citizens going to and coming back from Ka-
liningrad is by train. 
There is also fairly heavy goods traffic on the enclaveÕs border.
Due to its small area and low industrial potential, Kaliningrad is
dependent both upon goods imported from abroad and goods
transported from other regions of Russia. 
The highest trade turnover in Kaliningrad Oblast is recorded with
Germany (US$343.7 millions in 1999, of which US$134 millions
comes from import from Germany). Next comes Poland (US$209.6
millions in 1999, including US$114.3 millions from import from
Poland), then Lithuania (US$75m in 1999, including US$65m f r o m
import from Lithuania)2 9. These countries mainly provide food-
stuffs and processed manufactured goods. The enclave, in turn,
mainly exports raw materials, including oil and cellulose. 
Most goods come to the enclave from other regions of Russia via
Lithuania and Belarus (around 5 millions tonnes of goods reach
Kaliningrad this way annually)30. Also, between 80 and 100 per-
cent of electric current and raw materials for the power engi-
neering reach the Oblast via Lithuania, Belarus and Latvia31.
Military transport constitutes one particular type of transit. Sol-
diers and supplies for the Russian units stationed in the enclave
are transported across the Lithuanian-Kaliningrad border. What
the transports contain and the way the content is transported is
governed by detailed Lithuanian regulations. 
Poland and LithuaniaÕs accession to the European Union will ob-
lige them to introduce visas on the border with the Kaliningrad
Oblast, which will have a significant influence on cross-border
traffic, and consequently on the situation in the enclaveÕs border
areas as well. 
The structure of passenger border traffic presented at the begin-
ning of this section clearly shows that introducing visas will ma-
inly hit the minor smugglers. Limiting the Ôant tradeÕ will undoub-
tedly deprive some inhabitants in the enclave itself and in the 
Polish and Lithuania border areas of their income. Eliminating 
minor smuggling will also probably result in a significant drop in
the production of alcohol and cigarettes in the enclave (it is esti-
mated that the amount of alcohol produced for export is exactly
the same as the amount that is consumed annually by the inha-
bitants of Kaliningrad), and this will in turn result in adrop in the
OblastÕs budget revenues from excise duty. It seems, however,
that only a small number of people may directly suffer from ali-
mitation of the Ôant tradeÕ. The total number of people who live off
such trading on both sides of the Polish-Kaliningrad border is es-
timated at around 15 00032, so even after we add their families,
agents and producers of smuggled goods to the total, this is still
not a significant figure.
Limitations to cross-border traffic, moreover, may make trade be-
tween the enclave and neighbouring countries plus other regions
of Russia difficult. From the Polish and Lithuanian perspectives,
once the visa requirement is introduced, a drop in trade turnover
with the Kaliningrad Oblast will not be of much importance. Tr a d e
turnover with the enclave only amounts to 0.3 percent of Po l i s h
trade exchange3 3, and 2 percent of Lithuanian trade exchange3 4.
We may also see some positive after-effects of the Schengen ac-
cord, such as the limiting of illegal imports of alcohol, cigarettes,
fuel, drugs and arms to Poland. Visas may also make people from
the border areas look for more civilised ways of earning their li-
ving. Besides, the disappearance of the ÔantsÕ from border check-
points will facilitate trade operations for large enterprises, becau-
se waiting time at the border will become shorter. We should al-
so bear in mind that anormalisation of the situation on our east-
ern border may accelerate our accession to the Schengen area. 
1.5. The Kaliningrad enclaveÕs military
potential 
The armed forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast, which since the be-
ginning of the 1990s has been generally acknowledged as the
most militarised area in Europe, have undergone fundamental re-
organization. The Baltic Fleet (which is composed of all units sta-
tioned in the Oblast) is currently one of the best regarded organi-
sational and training operation units of the Russian army. It has
remained probably the only structure in the Russian Federa-
tionÕs Armed Forces of this level which has adapted to Rus-
siaÕs new economic and geopolitical situation. To a great degree,
the Baltic Fleet owes its current shape to its long-time
(1991Ð2000) commander, and current regional governor, Vladi-
mir Yegorov. The forceÕspotential has been maintained at a com-
parable level for several years, and will probably not undergo any
substantial change over the next few years, though further reduc-
tions have been announced. These must however be linked with
the liquidation of so-called Ôempty positionsÕ (in the military hie-
rarchy), which is currently being conducted in the Russian army
under the banner of reform. In Admiral YegorovÕsopinion, Russia
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is not interested in building up its armed forces in the region Ôfrom
either an economic or a military point of view.Õ
All military units of the Russian Armed Forces stationed in the Ka-
liningrad Oblast in operational terms create the Baltic Fleet and
are subordinated directly to its commander, who is at the same
time the commander of the Kaliningrad Special Defence District.
The commander of the Baltic Fleet is directly subordinated to the
chief of staff of the Russian Armed Forces and to the minister of
defence (at last, if the Navy is concerned Ð to its commander).
This situation puts the commander of the Baltic Fleet in a privile-
ged position towards the commanders of other military districts
and fleets. It is an unique case in the Russian army.
The military structures of the Kaliningrad Oblast are organisatio-
nally divided into navy and air units of the Baltic Fleet, land for-
ces, marine infantry and the coastal defence of the Land and 
Coastal Headquarters of the Forces of the Baltic Fleet. The com-
mand centre is found in Kaliningrad. During the reforms conduc-
ted in 1997Ð8 most administrative structures were liquidated,
and land units reduced by about 40 percent. Since then the po-
tential of Baltic Fleet has been maintained at a relatively stable
level. The general manpower of the Russian FederationÕs Armed
Forces in the Kaliningrad region does not exceed 25000 officers
and soldiers.
The navy and air units of the Baltic Fleet are a small group (the
Fleet has been de facto reduced to the dimensions of aflotilla, but
the name has been retained for reasons of prestige), but a group
which still possesses exceptional tactical value. The FleetÕs core
is made up of missile crafts, corvettes and mine countermeasu-
res. Principal surface combatants and submarines are used abo-
ve all as dummy targets in exercises. The ships are relatively
new; around 70 percent of them have been in service for less
than 15 years. The situation in the FleetÕs air force is similar; the
aeroplanes and helicopters are relatively modern and are to re-
main in service until 2010. The marine component of the Baltic
Fleet, after changes in the second half of the 1990s, is defensive
by nature; the idea of making a strike at the Danish straits was
given up at the same time as most of the large ships were with-
drawn. The exercises which have been conducted allow us to
suppose that in case of possible conflict the Fleet will aim to pa-
ralyse all navigation in the Baltic.
The Baltic Fleet land units are either incompletely manned or ca-
dre. The land forces cannot thus undertake any activity without
being supplemented by conscription. From observations of the
ÔWest-99Õ exercises, the conclusion can be drawn that in case of
possible conflict its task will be to link up with forces in Belarus.
In the years 1999Ð2000, mechanised and marine infantry units
from the Oblast participated interchangeably in action in Chech-
nya. Land units in the Kaliningrad Oblast have neither material
nor a technical base, and are dependent on external supply35.
It is suspected that tactical nuclear weaponry is located in Kali-
ningrad. This possibility was brought to light in January 2001 by
media in the US (including The Washington Times).
This information was based on areports of US military intelligen-
ce. Moscow categorically denied all reports of the deployment of
such weapons; the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Com-
mand of the Baltic Fleet also issued appropriate statements. It
should be highlighted that Russia is not bound by any formal
agreement which would prohibit the deployment of nuclear we-
apons in the Kaliningrad enclave. At the same time, however, the
Russian side unilaterally declared its will to create a non-nucle-
ar zone in the Baltic region. 
An analysis of unit relocation in the Kaliningrad Oblast starting
from the 1960s, and of changes from the first half of the 1990s,
indicates that tactical nuclear weapons may have been there the
whole time, irrespective of the information from January 2001 Ð
they were most probably never withdrawn from the enclave to be-
gin with. The possible relocation of new tactical nuclear weapons
does not, however, pose any great technical problems 36.
1.6. Environmental pollution
Regarding ecology, the situation in Kaliningrad is very bad. Most
pollution, however, generated by the Kaliningrad Oblast afflicts
the enclave itself, and does not pose any danger for neighbouring
countries. This pollution results from the presence of troops in the
region, and the open-cast extraction of amber, peat and brown
coal. The decline of KaliningradÕs industry means, however, that
the industry does not play a major role as asource of pollution. It
is difficult to evaluate the ecological consequences of the alleged
deployment (either now or in the past) of the nuclear and chemi-
cal weapons.
The most serious ecological threat Ð which does not stop at the
Oblast border Ð is linked with sewage discharge into the sea. This
afflicts all the countries of the Baltic Sea basin, to alesser (Scan-
dinavia) or greater extent (Poland). After Petersburg, Kaliningrad
is the second biggest sea polluter from among the Baltic cities.
The city discharges 400 000 tonnes of sewage water into the sea
annually37, most of which remains in the Vistula Lagoon. 
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2. The policies of Moscow 
and Western states towards 
the Kaliningrad Oblast
2.1. MoscowÐKaliningrad relations
KaliningradÕs individual geographical situation means that spe-
cial legal, economic and political solutions, different from those in
force in other territories of the Russian Federation, must be intro-
duced here for it to develop. These include such measures as
adapting the regionÕs legislation to the EUÕs standards, introdu-
cing customs and tax reductions, individual visa regimes and so
on. Most such decisions are within the gift of the Russian federal
authorities. Until recently, Moscow did not pay sufficient attention
to problem of its westernmost region; nor did it have any clear vi-
sion for that regionÕs development. In the past some senior cen-
tral officials quite plainly exploited the Kaliningrad enclave (aga-
inst its own interests) as a political pawn against the West; in
1995, for example, when faced with the declaration of Po-
landÕsacceptance into NATO, the location nuclear arms in the Ob-
last was threatened38. However, some very important changes
have taken place in Moscow-Kaliningrad relations during the last
six months. These were caused above all by two factors; firstly,
after the regional government elections in November, a group took
charge who were supported by the Kremlin and also loyal to it
(see point 1.1). KaliningradÕs new governor is such a influential
person in Moscow that he is able to implement joint federal ini-
tiatives for the Oblast. If Moscow succeeds in devising any kind
of concrete programme, it can be certain that the Kaliningrad go-
vernment will not only not sabotage it, but will do all it can to
bring such measures about. Secondly, a distinct increase in acti-
vities by the European Union towards the enclave has been obse-
rved for some time. One expression of this activity is the report
entitled ÔThe European Union and KaliningradÕ, published by the
European Commission on 17 January this year39 (more about this
report in point 2.2).
The change of leadership in the enclave, and also the EUÕs gro-
wing interest in Kaliningrad, have inclined Russia to intensify its
activities towards this region. Above all, Russia has defined its
interests regarding Kaliningrad in respect to the on-going process
of European integration. At a meeting on 8 March with EU repre-
sentatives in Stockholm, the head of the Russian ministry of fo-
reign affairs Igor Ivanov asked for KaliningradÕs interests to be ta-
ken into consideration during the expansion of the EU. To this end,
in his opinion, aspecial agreements should be signed with the EU
which would (among other things) guarantee freedom of move-
ment for goods and people between the enclave and the rest of
the country, favourable conditions for co-operation in the border
area, the maintenance of current fishing quotas for Kaliningrad fi-
shermen, energy supply via other countriesÕ territory, the encla-
veÕs inclusion into EU aid programmes, and so on40. During the
above-mentioned visit, Ivanov also criticised any attempts at
conducting international policy with the ÔomissionÕ of the federal
centreÕs involvement. It seems that this latter remark was provo-
ked by the recent revival of direct relations between Kaliningrad
and Vilnius. MoscowÕs antipathy was also aroused by the visit of
EU representatives to Kaliningrad on 15 February this year; the
Russians finally succeeded in extorting an unofficial character of
their stay in the enclave.
Considerably more severe Russian opinions were expressed in
the document Moscow sent in mid-2001 to Brussels and Vilnius,
according to information given by the Lithuanian media and con-
firmed by the Lithuanian minister for foreign affairs. This docu-
ment has not so far been officially published. Russia apparently
demands the maintenance of visa-free movement after Lithu-
anian accession to the EU. They also demand that rail transit
through Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia take place without border
checks, and also that Russian planes be given permission to use
the Lithuanian air corridor and land at Lithuanian airports.
Along with attempts to define and publicise Russian expectations
regarding the Kaliningrad Oblast, Moscow has taken up work on
creating a complex strategy for solving the enclaveÕs problems.
Such aprogram was put forward by governor Yegorov and the mi-
nister for trade and economic development German Gref at ases-
sion of the Russian Federation government on 22 March this year.
In this statement, they proposed a transformation of the Ob-
lastÕs economy from a net import basis, based on duty-free im-
port of raw materials and semi-manufactured articles, to a pro-
duction export basis. According to this idea, Russian (and espe-
cially Western) investors should produce high-quality goods che-
aply in the enclave, which would then be sold on in Western Eu-
rope. In these authorsÕ opinion, to attract capital to the region all
the Special Economic Zone regulations from 1996 must be intro-
duced (currently only 4 out of 21 are in operation). These should
be supplemented by clear instructions for conducting economic,
investment and banking activity. One suggestions was to simpli-
fy the procedures for certifying planning and registration of busi-
nesses and organisations (the so-called Ôone-windowÕ principle).
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The planÕsauthors indicate the necessity to limit the number and
duration of state controls on business, of building a second line
of gas pipeline, power plant and so on. The introduction of this
proposed project, however, seems improbable, for reasons inclu-
ding a lack of funding and lack of determination on the part of lo-
cal and federal government elites. But even if this plan is reali-
sed, it will not happen quickly, since the concept has not so far
won formal acceptance from cabinet, and the decisions taken at
the government session are of a merely introductory nature.
A solution to the Kaliningrad problem is undoubtedly important for
the Russian government. The apparent growth of MoscowÕsinte-
rest in the enclave over recent months seems however to be on-
ly partially caused by any desire to improve the situation there. It
cannot be ruled out that Kaliningrad is just being used by Moscow
as an excuse for continuing dialogue with the EU, and for initia-
ting solutions in this way which are both convenient for Russia
and which could be accepted within the process of European in-
tegration (for example regarding visas, trade exchange and so
on). In this context the KremlinÕs actions concerning Kaliningrad
must be seen as being partially subordinated to more general go-
als of Russian foreign policy.
2.2. Policy of Western countries towards
the enclave
The policy of Western countries has an important influence on the
Kaliningrad OblastÕs internal situation, and this influence will
probably continue to grow. Poland and LithuaniaÕsjoining the EU,
and Baltic states joining NATO, will turn Kaliningrad into an island
surrounded by a political, economic and military entity entirely
different from the Russian one. The policy of Brussels and of can-
didate states is dictated by fear that this difference may become
a source of danger. The EU is also treating the talks on Kalinin-
grad as an opportunity to exchange opinions with Russia on ma-
ny questions connected with the integration process.
Until recently, the impression could have been gained that the EU
is more interested in KaliningradÕs development than Russia is.
This happened especially during FinlandÕs presidency (in the se-
cond half of 1999). Finland promoted the idea of the ÔNorthern Di-
mensionÕ, which served (and still serves) to draw European co-
untriesÕ attention to questions of social, economic, transport and
security problems in the north-eastern part of the continent. Ho-
wever, so far it has only managed to co -ordinate the activities of
individual governments in the above-mentioned area to a small
degree, and has not created any process for financing any possi-
ble programmes at all. SwedenÕs presidency of the EU in the first
half of 2001 also led to agrowth in BrusselsÕ interest in the Kali-
ningrad Oblast. On 17 January this year the European Commis-
sionÕscommunication ãThe European Union and KaliningradÓ was
published. At a political level, this had the aim of presenting
BrusselsÕ good will to solve the Russian enclaveÕs problems and
persuading Russia to take apositive outlook on the process of ac-
cepting new members into the EU. Meanwhile in its essence the
communication describes all KaliningradÕs basic problems, and
presents suggestions for their partial or total elimination. This
therefore includes discussions on questions of tariffs, visas,
transit via Lithuania (including energy supplies), the construction
of transport corridors, environmental pollution and so on 41. The
documentÕs tone is unusually friendly towards Russia, and de-
monstrates the UnionÕs positive attitude to finding specific solu-
tions for the enclave (such as those regarding visa questions,
though in the report there is no concrete plan for dealing with it).
On the other hand, however, the European Commission clearly
stated that it will not agree to any special associate status, eco-
nomic union or visa-free regime for the region. The reportÕs
authors also dismissed any suggestion of starting an individual
Union fund for the enclave.
It seems that BrusselsÕ attitude is dictated by a desire not to set
precedents or negotiate overly favourable arrangements with sta-
tes (and especially provinces of states) which are not Ð and will
not, in the foreseeable future, become Ð EU members. In this si-
tuation it cannot be expected that the fifteen member states will
agree to sign any individual agreement with Moscow concerning
the enclave (see point 2.1), the basis for any Russia-EU underta-
kings will rather be formed by the ãPartnership and Co-operation
AccordÓ42. Meanwhile, governments of individual EU members
conduct their own projects with Kaliningrad. Most involved in hel-
ping the enclave are Denmark (which over the last ten years has
assigned over EUR 10 millions to aid projects), Sweden (EUR 4
millions), and Germany (over EUR 1 million)43. Projects financed
by these states include modernising the water and waste water
management in Kaliningrad, building houses for officers returning
to the reserves etc.44; however they have not included the most
important problems from the enclaveÕs point of view, namely the
modernisation of transport and industrial infrastructures.
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The Kaliningrad Oblast does not only enter into international di-
scussion in the context of the European integration process. Re-
cently several incidents have taken place when the area was
exploited in contentions which have nothing to do with either its
own situation or EU expansion. One example may be the article
published in February this year in the London Sunday Telegraph45,
which concerned German chancellor Gerhard SchroederÕs suppo-
sed agreement with President Vladimir Putin on reducing Russian
debts in exchange for awarding German companies specific li-
cences to do business in Kaliningrad, which would include giving
them ownership of state firms. Such an accord seems entirely
impossible, considering the basic foreign policy assumptions of
both Russia (including the integrity of the state, of which the ca-
se of the Kuril Islands is the most glaringly obvious) and Germa-
ny (which is aware that any inclinations to domination, even if
only economic in nature, in the former East Prussia would be
a breach of the post-war order, and would bring forth strongly ne-
gative reaction from both other Western countries and the USA).
In this context, the Sunday Telegraph article must be seen as
a conscious manipulation of concealed political forces on the Ôold
continentÕ, which is aimed at disrupting the good intentions and
reliability of BerlinÕ s policy towards Moscow, and at the same time
at suspending any rapprochement between these two capitals.
Such amanipulation is undoubtedly in the interests of both Fran-
ce and England, who wish to prevent Germany and Russia from
becoming excessively close.
3. Conclusion; attempts 
at prediction
The analysis of KaliningradÕs internal and international situation
as presented above leads us to describe two hypothetical scena-
rios for the development of future events:
1: Kaliningrad as a European advance post in Russia Ð the enc-
lave achieves a certain autonomy from Moscow, and enters into
close co-operation with its neighbours and the European Union.
Legal and economic solutions are gradually introduced there
which are close to those existing in surrounding countries. The
enclaveÕs internal situation gradually improves. 
2: Kaliningrad as an underdeveloped island Ð the region is tre-
ated by Moscow similarly to the rest of the Russian regions; its
opportunities to act independently are very limited, and as acon -
sequence the socio-economic distance between the enclave and
its neighbours grows, which leads to deepening isolation. The
enclaveÕseconomic situation is worse than that in the majority of
the Russian Federation.
At the present moment, neither of the current scenarios can yet
be ruled out. However, a range of factors indicate that pessimi-
stic turn of events seems to be significantly more likely. Events in
the region during the past decade are in favour of the second sce-
nario described: an above-average fall in living standards (in
comparison to other regions of the Russian Federation), together
with a growth in social problems, indicates that Kaliningrad has
lost much more by its division from the rest of country than it has
been able to benefit from its closeness to Western Europe. The 
initiatives taken so far which were aimed at breaking the re-
gionÕs isolation (above all the introduction of Free Economic Zone
and then the Special Economic Zone) did not bring the expected
result. This is demonstrated e.g. by the fall in recent years of in-
dicators of trade turnover between the Russian enclave and other
countries.
The opportunity to change KaliningradÕscritical situation lies abo-
ve all in MoscowÕs hands. Until recently the federal authorities
did not display any great interest in the enclave, and the activi-
ties it undertook were partial and inconsistent. Despite arecently
visible growth in MoscowÕs interest in Kaliningrad, it seems unli-
kely in the long term that the Kremlin will agree to any meaning-
ful legal autonomy for this province (currently tendencies to the
unification of legislation predominate in Russia).
However, even if the Kremlin devises a coherent strategy for Ka-
liningrad, and decides to allow the introduction of solutions con-
cerning the regionÕs specific needs, the undemocratic and non-
market processes of political and economic life in the Oblast will
remain a barrier to its strengthening economic and political co-
operation with neighbouring states and the EU. These processes
include pervasive corruption, the authoritiesÕ links with criminal
structures, non-compliance with the law, and inefficiency at the
judiciary level (the courts are corrupt and de facto dependent on
executive authority). It is hard to imagine that in a situation where
such processes are the norm throughout the whole country, they
could be eliminated in just one of its regions.
The rather unfavourable outlook confronting the region at this 
time may be somewhat eased by international aid (especially from
the EU). Such support will not change the vastly different situ-
ation in the enclave, but it may however significantly ease certain
negative economic, ecological or social phenomena. One factor
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which may facilitate collaboration between the region and the
Union may be the enclaveÕs new governor, who in contrast to his
predecessor is open to any international contacts. Wiping out the
negative processes in Kaliningrad is not only in the OblastÕs own
interests, but also those of the Union itself. This is because the
growing distance between this region and the countries which
surround it is linked with the growth in the threat which the enc-
lave poses for its neighbours (mainly as a result of its spreading
social problems). It must however be stated that with regard to
the enclaveÕs small size, even these increasing threats will have
a rather small significance.
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